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SHOULD UNNECESSARY HARMFUL
NONTHERAPEUTIC COSMETIC SURGERY
BE CRIMINALIZED?
Dennis J. Baker*
In this article, it is argued that an application of the harm principle to many forms
of nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery shows that these procedures are a form of physical
harm, not a form of medicine, and therefore ought to be criminalized. Not only does
the harm principle support the case for criminalization, but so too do the relevant
precedents. This article focuses on the general moral justiﬁcations (wrongful harm
to others) for criminalizing unnecessary harmful cosmetic surgery, but legal doctrine
is also invoked to demonstrate that there is a legal justiﬁcation for criminalization.
The famous English case of R. v. Brown1 will be discussed to outline the core
legal case for criminalization. This article does not aim to provide a compara-
tive study of the U.S. and English authorities, but rather aims to make theo-
retical arguments for criminalization, and thus, works from the legal premise
that in most states the U.S. courts have taken a similar position to that taken
in the seminal English House of Lords decision in R. v. Brown.
Keywords: criminal law, cosmetic surgery, criminalization, minors,
medicine
I N TRODUCT ION
The medical profession has medicalized a range of harmful procedures that
provide no long-term beneﬁt for their (putative patients) victims. It will be
argued that a statutory criminal offense is required to protect adults from
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unnecessary harmful nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery. Furthermore, it is
argued that if the consent of adults cannot annul the wrongness of unnec-
essary harmful nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery,2 a fortiori a minor’s (for
present purposes, a person aged under 18) consent cannot annul the wrong-
ness of such surgery. The general focus is on wrongful harm to others as
justiﬁcation for criminalizing this sort of surgery. In the case of minors
additional factors lend weight to the case for criminalization. Arguably, the
reduced capacity and vulnerability of minors adds weight to the case for
protecting all minors from such surgery.
The core justiﬁcation for criminalizing this sort of surgery for minors is
the same as for criminalizing it for adults: The core justiﬁcation in both
cases is that this sort of surgery involves wrongful harm to others. A minor’s
immaturity and vulnerability are only additional factors that balance the
scales further in favor of criminalization. At the very least there should be
a special offense to protect minors, because those aged 17 and under are
particularly vulnerable to peer and media pressure. Coupled with this, even
a mature minor lacks the maturity of an experienced adult.
Harmful cosmetic surgery that is nontherapeutic and otherwise unnec-
essary cannot be justiﬁed as lawful under the prevailing U.S. and English
authorities3 because the precedents deny consent as a defense to wanton
violence that results in bodily harm, unless it comes within one of the
exceptions where the courts have recognized consent as a defense. In R.
v. Brown,4 the House of Lords held that consent does not provide a defense
to those who inﬂict actual or grievous (serious) bodily harm upon others
unless the harm results from (1) reasonable surgical operations, (2) reason-
able adornment procedures,5 (3) properly conducted sports games, (4)
dangerous feats and exhibitions, (5) reasonable horseplay.6
2. R. v. Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212. The U.S. courts have taken a similar approach. See Bass
v. State (1961) 120 SE 2d 580; People v. Kevorkian (2001) 248 Mich. App. 373; Common-
wealth v. Appleby (1980) 380 Mass. 296; People v. Samuels (1967) 250 Cal. App. 2d 501.
3. R. v. Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212 is a case that has attracted a lot of attention from scholars on
both sides of the Atlantic. This year alone it has been discussed in Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive
Law, (2014) 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89; Jack Anderson, The Right to a Fair Fight: Sporting Lessons
on Consensual Harm, (2014) 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 55; Elaine Craig, Capacity to Consent to
Sexual Risk, (2014) 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 103; Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness
Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, (2014) 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597.
4. [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
5. R. v. Wilson [1997] Q.B. 47.
6. R. v. Jones (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 375.
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The consenting victims of nontherapeutic harmful cosmetic surgery
may not feel wronged because they consent, but they are wronged and
harmed. They are wronged and harmed because the surgeon uses them as
a means to an end, that is, as an object for making money. The issue is not
about criminalizing the consenter (the putative patient); instead, it is about
criminalizing the harm-doer, the surgeon. A criminal offense would not
limit the self-harmer’s freedom to self-harm7; her freedom would be lim-
ited only to the extent that others will be deterred from harming her.
In R. v. Brown a group of sadomasochists voluntarily and enthusiasti-
cally committed acts of violence against each other, because they achieved
sexual gratiﬁcation from being subjected to violence and pain. The appel-
lants were arraigned on various counts under §§ 20 and 47 of the Offenses
Against the Person Act 1861 (U.K.) for aggravated assault, for inﬂicting
wounds and actual bodily harm on the genital and other areas of the bodies
of each other. Space prohibits consideration of all the R. v. Brown excep-
tions where consent provides a defense, so the discussion in this article will
be only on the reasonable surgery exception.
It will be agued that the decision of the English House of Lords in R. v.
Brown only provides an exception for genuine medicine. Nontherapeutic
cosmetic surgery resulting in minor injury and no long-term damage might
come within the reasonable adornment exception, but unnecessary non-
therapeutic surgery that results in serious longer-term harm does not come
within the adornment or medical exceptions.
I . D IRECT HARM
Cosmetic surgery is a growth industry.8 The remote harm to society is that
scarce medical resources are used for nonlegitimate and unnecessary
7. Self-mutilation might result from a psychiatric disorder, but it might also be culturally
contingent. See the examples given in ARMANDO R. FAVAZZA, BODIES UNDER SIEGE: SELF-
MUTILATION IN CULTURE AND PSYCHIATRY (2nd ed. 1996).
8. Statistics from the American Society of Plastic Surgeons show that in the United States
in 2012, 14.6 million cosmetic plastic surgery procedures were performed. See http://www.
plasticsurgery.org/news/press-release-archives/2013/14-million-cosmetic-plastic-surgery-
procedures-performed-in-2012.html. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, it has been reported
that 50,122 cosmetic procedures were performed in 2013, which is a 17% increase on the
previous year. See James Gallagher, Plastic Surgery ‘‘Booming’’ in the UK, (BBC NEWS, Feb. 3,
2014).
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surgical procedures when they could be used elsewhere to cure people who
are ill.9 It is a market that results in remote harms, because it uses up
valuable medical resources that are needed elsewhere. I have argued else-
where that doing remote harm rarely provides a basis for direct criminal-
ization.10 Who is the remote harm-doer? Is it the putative patient who
supplies the demand that is the cosmetic surgery industry’s raison d’eˆtre?
What motivates the putative patient to seek such procedures? Arguably the
core impetus for the market is the social and cultural environment we live
in where the masses are obsessed with celebrities, youth, and beauty.11
Celebrity, youth, and beauty are held up as values that outweigh skill and
merit in our society.
Nonetheless, the direct harm-doer is the surgeon who chooses to
use her skills to make money from providing nontherapeutic harmful
surgery instead of therapeutic surgery. Remote harms should be dealt
with via noncriminal state responses. In this article, the focus is on the
direct harm-doer. The surgeon directly harms the putative patient by
providing her with unnecessary harmful nontherapeutic cosmetic
surgery.
Medical professionals have a moral and legal duty to act in the best
interests of their patients and to take reasonable care when treating
9. For example, in Britain it has been observed: ‘‘The demand for labial reduction
surgery is constantly increasing. Healthcare funds are becoming limited and in the current
ﬁnancial and National Health Service atmosphere labiaplasty might be seen as luxury rather
than a necessity. It could be argued it places an unnecessary burden on the already scarce
healthcare funds. In many units this procedure is no longer provided by the NHS. The vast
majority of women seeking surgery have normal labia. More than 50% of these women do
so because they perceive their labia enlarged and wish to make them smaller to improve
appearance.’’ See Elisabeth J. Adams et al., Labiaplasty, 22(2) OBSTETRICS, GYNECOLOGY
& REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 50 at 52 (2012).
10. See Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, 10(3) NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 370 (2007); DENNIS J. BAKER, THE RIGHT NOT TO BE CRIMINALIZED:
DEMARCATING CRIMINAL LAW’S AUTHORITY, at ch. 4 (2011).
11. On socialization and consumer identity choices, see Shay Sayre, Cosmetic Surgery and
Self-Transformation, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO IDENTITY AND CONSUMPTION
159 (Ayalla A. Ruvio & Russell W. Belk eds., 2012); R. Taylor et. al., Acceptance of Cosmetic
Surgery and Celebrity Worship: Evidence of Associations Among Female Undergraduates, 47(8)
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 869 (2009); J. Maltby & L. Day, Celebrity
Worship and Incidence of Elective Cosmetic Surgery: Evidence of a Link Among Young Adults,
49(5) J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 483 (2011).
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patients.12 They have a duty to exercise such reasonable care, as the
patient’s known medical condition requires. They have long been allowed
to risk causing serious harm to a patient where, on the balance of inter-
ests, the risky medical procedure was the lesser of two evils.13 A surgeon
can take risks, but the risks must be calculated and aimed at enhancing
the patient’s health interests.14 Medical procedures carried out in a grossly
negligent manner, in some circumstances, will result in criminal liability.15
Seven hundred years ago, Horne wrote:
Again ye are to distinguish of other men-slayers; as of physicians, jurors,
justices, witnesses, of ideots, madmen and fugitives; for physicians and
chirurgions are skilful in their faculties, and probably do lawful cures having
good consciences, so as nothing faileth to the patient which to their art
belongeth; if their patients die, they are not thereby men-slayers or mayhe-
mors; but if they take upon them a cure, and have no knowledge or skill
therein; or if they have knowledge, if nevertheless they neglect the cure, or
minister that which is cold for hot, or hot for cold, or take little care thereof,
or neglect due diligence therein, and especially in burning, and cutting off of
members which they are forbidden to do but at the peril of their patient; if
12. That does not mean that doctors have to act in the patient’s best interests, if she has
full capacity and refuses a medically necessary amputation and so on. See Heart of England
NHS Foundation Trust v. JB [2014] EWHC 342 (COP); Schreiber by Krueger v. Physi-
cians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin (1998) 217 Wis. 2d 94. Cf. Great Western Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust v. AA [2014] EWHC 132 (Fam); Woolley v. Henderson, (1980) 418 A.2d
1123. On the duties doctors owe patients, and the scope of the duty, see R. v. Adomako [1995]
1 A.C. 171; see also the insightful U.S. authorities such as Simpson v. Davis (1976) 219 Kan.
584 at 587; Stevenson v. Yates (191) 208 S.W. 820; Marshall v. Klebanov (2006) 188 902 A.2d
873; White v. Harris (2011) 36 A.3d 203; Ward v. U.S. (1988) 838 F.2d 182; Meena v. Wilburn
(1992) 603 So. 2d 866.
13. R. v. Cox (1992) 12 B.M.L.R. 38.
14. See the discussion in DENNIS J. BAKER, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS: TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW, ch.24 (2012). See also In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical
Separation) [2001] 2 W.L.R. 480. In State v. Beck (1833) 1 Hill (SC) 363, Harper, J. said: ‘‘If,
according to the prescription of the physician in the Arabian Nights, a physician should
beat his patient with a mallet, for the bona ﬁde purpose of restoring his health, . . . it would
be no battery.’’ Cf. Alec Walen, Doing, Allowing, and Disabling: Some Principles Governing
Deontological Restrictions, 80(2) PHIL. STUD. 183 (1995).
15. Generally, English criminal law does not contain offenses of negligence. The core
exception is gross negligence manslaughter. See R. v. Adomako [1995] 1 A.C. 171. Cf. the
position in some U.S. jurisdictions, Tarpeh v. U.S. (2013) 62 A.3d 1266; Sanchez v. Pereira-
Castillo (2009) 590 F.3d 31.
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their patients die, or lose their members, in such cases they are men-slayers
or mayhemors.16
Interestingly, Horne states that surgeons should not wantonly remove limbs
because that is forbidden. Horne not only refers to manslaughter, but also
to the old common law offense of maiming. In R. v. Wright17 it was held
that: ‘‘[A] person who . . .maims himself, or procures another to maim him,
that he may have more color to beg; or disables himself to prevent being
pressed for a soldier is subject to ﬁne and imprisonment at common law;
and so is the party by whom it was effected at the other’s desire.’’ Horne
said, ‘‘Mayhem is the want of member, or the enfeebling of it by breaking,
or cutting the bones of a man, whereby he is less able to combat.’’18
In State v. Bass,19 Bryson told Bass (a physician) that he was going to cut
off his ﬁngers to try to obtain insurance money. The physician refused to
amputate Bryson’s ﬁngers, but accepted payment to inject his ﬁngers with
procaine so that he would not feel pain when the attempt was made to cut
off his ﬁngers. Bass also gave Bryson a rubber tourniquet to stop the likely
bleeding and showed him how to apply and use it. Thereafter, a third party,
Tryson, at Bryson’s request, used an electric saw to cut off four ﬁngers.
Moore, J., took the view that Bass was criminally liable as an accessory to
the maiming because he assisted the perpetrator and instigator of the
maiming. It also was held that consent provided no defense, because of
the level of harm inﬂicted. Moore, J., was not only concerned about the
ulterior attempted fraud that Bass knowingly facilitated, but also about the
16. ANDREW HORNE, THE MIRROUR OF JUSTICES at 206 (W. H. of Gray’s Inn, trans.,
1903). The Mirrour of Justices was ﬁrst published in 1328 in old French: the original man-
uscript is in the Parker Library, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge (manuscript identiﬁer
CCCC MS 258)).
17. This is the text of the case as reported in EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN, Vol. I at 396 (1803).
18. HORNE, supra note 16, at 45. Cf. R. v. Tickner (1778) 1 Leach 187; R. v. Lee (1763) 1
Leach 51; R. v. Mills (1783) 1 Leach 259; R. v. Hunt (1825) 1 Mood. C.C. 93. ‘‘Note, the life
and members of every subject are under the safeguard and protection of the king to the end
that they may serve the king and their countrie, when occasion shall be offered. . . .Nay, the
lord of the villiene, for the cause aforesaid, cannot mayhem the villiene, but the king shall
punish him for mayheming of his subject (for that hereby he hath disabled him to do the
king service) by ﬁne, ransome, and imprisonment, until the ﬁne and ransome be paid.’’’ SIR
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND at 127a,
288a (1670).
19. (1961) 120 SE 2d 580.
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harm posed to society where a person uses another to disable him- or
herself.
It was once a crime to commit suicide or self-maim, but that is no longer
the law in England and Wales nor in most states in the United States. The
Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 (U.K) replaced the old offense of
maiming and did not replace it with any offense that criminalizes self-harm.
Self-harm requires a medical response, not a criminal law response. The
medical cost to the state is a remote harm and thus should not be used as
a basis for criminalization. In cases where the self-harm is perpetrated to
facilitate some ulterior crime such as insurance fraud, the appropriate
criminal law response is to convict the self-harmer of the ulterior crime
alone (i.e., fraud).
Furthermore, a person should not be liable as an accessory for allowing
another to harm her.20 If the surgeon in State v. Bass21 had used proper
medical procedures to remove the consenter’s ﬁngers to help the consenter
to commit fraud, there would have been no bar (assuming he had the
requisite mens rea for complicity) to convicting him as accessory to fraud.
What’s more, such a surgeon should be convictable of an aggravated
assault, because he deliberately inﬂicts serious bodily harm upon another
without lawful justiﬁcation. The fact that other has consented to the harm
does not provide a defense, because the wrongness of wantonly inﬂicting
serious harm upon another human being is not annulled by the victim’s
consent.22
The harm in a case like State v. Bass is not an inherent aspect or side
effect of genuine therapeutic surgery, nor is it reasonable adornment, so
consent should provide no defense. Even if a surgeon uses the same safe
medical procedures (i.e., performs the surgery lege artis: according to the
rules of medicine) that he would have used if the ﬁngers had needed to be
removed for a genuine medical reason such as to stop gangrene from
spreading,23 the patient’s consent is no defense when the surgery is merely
20. See DENNIS J. BAKER, REINTERPRETING COMPLICITY, Ch. 3 (2015, forthcoming).
21. (1961) 120 SE 2d 580.
22. BAKER, supra note 14, at Ch. 23.
23. In a time when self-murder was still a crime, Hale wrote: ‘‘If A. with an intent to
prevent a gangrene beginning in his hand doth without any advice cut off his hand, by
which he dies, he is not thereby felo de se, for tho it was a voluntary act, yet it was not with an
intent to kill himself.’’ MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN at
412 (1736).
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aimed at facilitating insurance fraud. Such a surgeon does not act for
a medical purpose, but to facilitate fraud. This sort of wanton surgery is
not lawfully justiﬁable because the surgery is therapeutically unnecessary
and results in serious injury. Such a surgeon is not relying on the defense of
medical necessity or necessity more generally, but simply on the consent of
the patient.24 The latter is not enough to annul the wrongness of ampu-
tating healthy ﬁngers to facilitate insurance fraud. Instead, the surgeon
causes the consenting patient unnecessary serious bodily harm for a non-
therapeutic reason.
The common themes in the case law are simply that a putative medical
procedure resulting in serious injury has to in fact involve genuine thera-
peutic medicine (medical necessity) or otherwise come within the general
defense of necessity. Unnecessary serious bodily harm ought not be dis-
guised as therapeutic medicine.
It is worth bearing in mind that some forms of cosmetic surgery are
therapeutic and thus would not be criminalizable because the criteria for
criminalization presented in this article are: (1) The surgery is nonthera-
peutic. (2) The surgery is unreasonable in that it unnecessarily risks harm-
ing the patient for no greater end. Thus, the surgeon will have a defense if
the nontherapeutic surgery is required as a matter of medical necessity or
necessity more generally, such as to serve some other social end as is the case
when a surgeon performs a nontherapeutic sterilization on a person suffer-
ing from a mental disability to allow the putative consenter to have some
sexual autonomy.25
Similarly, the surgeon will have a defense where the unnecessary non-
therapeutic surgery is reasonable in that it does not result in long-term
harm and facilitates the autonomy choices of the consenter, as is the case
24. In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilization) [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
25. See the discussion in John Stanton-Ife,Mental Disorder and Sexual Consent: Williams
and After, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW at 204 (Dennis J. Baker et
al., eds., 2013). In exceptional circumstances nontherapeutic surgery is needed as a matter of
necessity to prevent social harm to the putative (incapacitated) consenter. See An N.H.S.
Trust v. DE [2013] 3 F.C.R. 343; Re Eve [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 at { 48; Re A (Male Sterili-
zation) [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549. In these cases, the justiﬁcation for allowing the nontherapeutic
surgery seems to be necessity, since the harm involved in sterilization serves the greater good
(lesser evil) of allowing the consenter to have some sexual freedom. Necessity seems to
permeate the arguments presented by the Lords in In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilization)
[1990] 2 A.C. 1. Cf. the discussion on nontherapeutic abortions in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services (1989) 492 U.S. 490.
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with respect to milder forms of body adornment that are performed on
consenting adults. The surgery will be reasonable only if it carries a low risk
of resulting in unintended harm. Section 213A of Queensland’s Public
Health Act 2005, which makes it a criminal offense for surgeons to provide
medically unnecessary cosmetic surgery for minors, includes the following
useful standard:
The Minister must not recommend to the Governor in Council the making
of a regulation under subsection (2) unless the Minister is satisﬁed that—(a)
performance of the procedure on a child is unlikely to compromise the health
or safety of the child; and (b) the procedure is routinely performed with
minimal adverse outcomes. [Emphasis added.]
One might ask: How can cosmetic surgery be routinely performed without
adverse outcomes, if it is never safety-tested? The answer is obvious. It
would have to have been applied initially as a last resort in medical necessity
cases, as might be the case where surgeons develop a technique for treating
those who have suffered injuries in an accident or ﬁre. If such a procedure
becomes routine and safe after being used for medical necessities for
a period of time, it might evolve to be a form of legitimate nontherapeutic
(reasonably) ‘‘harmless’’ cosmetic surgery.26 Hence, surgeons can risk grave
harm when they are trying to achieve some greater good such as curing
a patient, but not when they are merely trying to improve someone’s
appearance for the sake of serving that person’s vanity.
I I . THE L IM I TS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE FOR
UNNECESSARY HARM TO ADULTS
This article works from the premise that consensual cosmetic surgery can
be the result of a putative patient making a fully informed decision and
rational choice to have the surgery.27 Hence, it is not my aim to explore
when consent is rational and informed and therefore valid. There are
26. Nontherapeutic sterilizations are also permissible when they are not a medical
necessity, as the procedure has proved to be relatively safe and has minimal long-term health
effects. Courts have held that such sterilizations are permissible. See Custodio v. Bauer
(1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 303; Shaheen v. Knight (1957) 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41.
27. Cf. Martin Van Hees, Acting Autonomously Versus not Acting Heteronomously, 54(4)
THEORY & DECISION 337 (2003).
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extreme cases where adults who are addicted to dangerous cosmetic surgery
do not make fully rational choices, even though those choices are regarded
as autonomous choices under the current law in the United States and
Britain. A social environment where people are indoctrinated or inﬂuenced
to seek a particular image that has been created by society, or some subset
of society, can lead to wholly irrational decisions.28 Nonetheless, many of
these decisions are sufﬁciently informed to count as autonomous under our
current law.
Many cases that are treated as involving autonomous and fully informed
decision making are questionable.29 Take the example of the ‘‘Tiger Man.’’
For some subjective reason the ‘‘Tiger Man’’ thought he would look better
as a tiger and had many dangerous and unnecessary cosmetic procedures to
make his head appear like that of a tiger. (A Google image search of the
Tiger Man will leave most viewers questioning whether the surgeons
involved acted reasonably in repeatedly performing dangerous cosmetic
procedures for ﬁnancial gain, without insisting that the Tiger Man seek
a purely psychiatric remedy to cure his compulsive obsession to appear as
a tiger.30)
There seem to be cases where the validity of the consenter’s consent is
questionable because of the distorted information that is used by the
decision-maker to form the decision to have surgery. Misinformation and
unreasonable social inﬂuences can lead to irrational decision making.31
28. The social information relied on to inform the decision distorts the decision.
Compare the discussion in Insoo Hyun, Authentic Values and Individual Autonomy, 35(2) J.
VALUE INQUIRY 195 (2001).
29. See for example, Yamin v. Commissioner of Social Sec. (2009) F. Supp. 2d, 2009 WL
799457, where a cosmetic surgeon carried out surgery on a mentally ill woman.
30. On the psychological conditions that might inﬂuence decisions to have nonthera-
peutic surgery, see Cihan Sahin et al., Patient Selection in Plastic Surgery: Recognizing Body
Dysmorphic Disorder, 2(2) ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL SURGERY 109 (2013);
W. L. Ericksen et al., Psychiatric Issues in Cosmetic Plastic Surgery, 83 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 343
(2012); K.A. Phillips, Psychosis in Body Dysmorphic Disorder, 38(1) J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 63
(2004); S. Bellino et al., Dysmorphic Concern Symptoms and Personality Disorders: A Clinical
Investigation in Patients Seeking Cosmetic Surgery, 144(1) PSYCHIATRY RES. 73 (2006), where
it was observed ‘‘that the presence of a psychopathological reaction to imagined defects in
appearance in subjects pursuing a surgical correction is associated with the severity of
schizotypal and paranoid personality disorders.’’
31. Lehrer writes, ‘‘there is something odd about the idea that a person who is enslaved by
his passions is autonomous.’’ See Keith Lehrer, Reason and Autonomy, 20(2) SOC. POL’Y &
PHIL. 177 (2003).
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Nonetheless, in the cases discussed here it is assumed that the consent is
valid because it is assumed to have come from a fully informed autonomous
adult. In the cases involving minors under the age of 16, it is assumed their
consent is not valid because of their intellectual immaturity.32
As we will see, there also is a grey area between adult and minor, because
some minors above the age of 16 and below the age of 18 are treated as being
sufﬁciently mature to provide valid consent. In these cases, it will be agued
that the decision whether or not to have unnecessary nontherapeutic sur-
gery is a decision that a minor between the ages of 16 and 18 should not have
to make because they are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure and
distorted media messages. Some have argued that minors in this category
have less maturity than adults. Whether the latter can be proved or not, few
would doubt that minors are more impressionable and vulnerable than
adults.
It will be argued in the next section that the age of consent for unnec-
essary nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery should be 18 years of age, even
though some 17-year-olds may be more mature than some 20-year-olds.
The line has to be drawn somewhere. To some extent the ability of a mature
minor to consent to harmful cosmetic surgery is moot, because consent is
no defense for adults or minors where the unnecessary nontherapeutic
cosmetic surgery results in grievous bodily harm. To establish this, let us
ﬁrst consider the limits of adult consent as a defense.
The volenti doctrine holds that she who consents is not wrongfully
harmed by the harm-doer’s conduct.33 The limits of the volenti non ﬁt
iniuria (‘‘to a willing person, injury is not done’’) doctrine34 were laid down
32. Something that seemed to be overlooked in the old case of Reynolds v. People (1881) 41
How. Pr. 179, where the volenti doctrine was allowed as a defense in a case where a 19-year-
old man sexually assaulted a 12-year-old girl. Cf. Lawrence v. Lawrence (2010) 360 S.W.3d
416 at 420. See also the offenses in §§ 5–15 of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003.
33. For a penetrating discussion of the doctrine in the criminal law context, see JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 98–262 (1986).
34. The doctrine has been applied in tort cases for centuries. In Roger Grendon v. The
Bishop of Lincoln (1575) 2 Plow. 493 at 501, it was said: ‘‘But if a parson imparsonee presents
another, thereby he has disappropriated the advowson, and made it presentable ever after, as
Manwood said; for, he said, volenti non ﬁt injuria, but against his will no one can tor-
tiously disappropriate it.’’ See also Bracebridge (1404) Jenk. 73. The rule also has been
applied in criminal cases. Coke mentioned it early on in his criminal law volume. See
EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THIRD PART at 80 (1648).
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by the Law Lords in R. v. Brown.35 (The American courts have taken
a broadly similar approach).36 Consent is no defense where the defendant
has inﬂicted actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm upon another,
unless the harm results from conduct that comes within one of the excep-
tions recognized in R. v. Brown. The courts have held that harm resulting
from legitimate sporting accidents and harm resulting from deliberate
violence that is a part of a lawfully recognized violent sport, such as boxing,
comes within the exceptions. The courts also have held that trivial harm
resulting from lawful correction comes within the exception.37 In addition,
it has been held that ‘‘ephemeral’’ harm resulting from reasonable body
adornment38 procedures and from reasonable surgery come within the
exceptions.39 Coupled with this, it has been held that accidental harm
resulting from reasonable horseplay could come within the exception.40
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has observed:
The law in the United Kingdom, as stated by the majority in R. v. Brown, is
that consent is a complete answer in relation to simple assault but not to
assault that occasions actual bodily harm, except in recognized categories of
cases, including surgery, lawful sports, tattooing and body piercing. Even in
cases involving those recognized exceptions, however, it appears that conduct will
be criminal, despite consent, where the conduct is sufﬁciently grave to be char-
acterized as criminal.41 [Emphasis added.]
Elsewhere, it has been argued that the decision in R. v. Brown is reconcil-
able with critical morality, because it protects the humanity (dignity) of the
consenting party.42 Rather than reconsider the debate on whether consent
35. [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
36. R. v. Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212. See also Bass v. State (1961) 120 SE 2d 580; People v.
Kevorkian (2001) 248 Mich. App. 373; Commonwealth v. Appleby (1980) 380 Mass. 296;
People v. Samuels (1967) 250 Cal. App. 2d 501.
37. See BAKER, supra note 14, at Ch. 20.
38. R. v. Wilson [1997] Q.B. 47 at 50 per Russell, L.J.
39. See Bass v. State (1961) 120 SE 2d 580; People v. Kevorkian (2001) 248Mich. App. 373;
Commonwealth v. Appleby (1980) 380Mass. 296; People v. Samuels (1967) 250Cal. App. 2d
501.
40. See generally, BAKER, supra note 14, at Ch. 23.
41. R. v. Lee [2006] 3 N.Z.L.R. 42 at { 219.
42. DENNIS J. BAKER, The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 12
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 93 (2009). See also Hamish Stewart, Kantian Police: Limits of Consent
in Regulatory Law, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2014); Hamish Stewart, The Limits of Consent
and the Law of Assault, 24 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 205 (2011).
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can annul the wrongness of wanton harm to others, this article works from
the premise that needlessly causing others to suffer grievous bodily harm
violates their worth as a human being regardless of whether they desire that
degradation of their dignity. Thus, in this article it is taken as a given that
wanton serious bodily harm to others violates their dignity as a human
being and is wrongful for this reason. Similarly, a court in Germany has
held that male circumcision carried out on a minor to satisfy a religious
ritual is a violation of the child’s integrity.43
If a person consents to another throwing acid in her eyes so that she will
be left blind for life, she is harmed, even though she may not personally
consider herself wronged. To some extent consent can annul wrongness,
but it can never neutralize or annul physical harm. Physical harm is some-
thing that all species are biologically programmed to avoid. Subjective
preferences44 and socialization cannot change the biological nature of
physical pain or physical damage. Inﬂicting serious bodily harm upon
others injures both the perpetrator and the victim: it damages the perpe-
trator’s character, and it causes direct physical harm to the victim.
Nonetheless, consent is not denied as a defense to prevent self-harm, it is
denied as a defense to prevent harm to others. The law does not hold that
‘‘you must not harm yourself ’’; it merely states that others should not rely
on your consent to deny you basic respect as a human being. A person is
still free to harm herself. That is her personal choice, and the law does not
43. See Jan F. Orth, Explaining the Cologne Circumcision Decision, 77(6) J. CRIM. L. 497
(2013), where § 223 of the German Criminal Code (s. 223 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)) was
invoked. § 223 { 1 StGB provides: ‘‘Whosoever physically assaults or damages the health of
another person shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding ﬁve years or a ﬁne.’’ Cf.
Tasmania Law Reform Institute, Non-therapeutic Male Circumcision: Final Report (2012).
44. See J. Slevec & M. Tiggemann, Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery in Middle-aged
Women: Body Image, Aging Anxiety, and the Media, 34(1) PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 65 (2010).
Feminists attribute celebrity beauty standards to patriarchal socialization, but such a view is
perhaps too simplistic to explain the fuller biological and social motivators behind decisions
to have surgery. Cf. the feminist arguments presented in Michelle Leve & Lisa Ruben,
Cosmetic Surgery and Neoliberalisms: Managing Risk and Responsibility, 22(1) FEMINISM &
PSYCHOL. 122 (2012); Patricia Gagne & Deanna McGaughey, Designing Women: Cultural
Hegemony and the Exercise of Power Among Women Who have Undergone Elective Mam-
moplasty, 16(6) GENDER & SOC’Y 814 (2002); Tamar Wilson, Pharaonic Circumcision under
Patriarchy and Breast Augmentation under Phallocentric Capitalism: Similarities and Differ-
ences, 8(4) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 495 (2002).
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deny her the freedom to engage in self-harm.45 Of course, the state will try
to get the self-harmer to accept treatment to prevent her from self-harming.
In extreme cases, a person suffering mental illness may be detained in
a mental hospital.
It has been argued elsewhere that the Law Lords were too restrictive in
denying consent as a defense to both grievous bodily harm (serious physical
bodily harm) and actual bodily harm (nonserious physical bodily harm).46
It has been argued elsewhere that actual bodily harm is not sufﬁcient to
override consent as a defense. It is true that a person who harms another
disregards that person’s human worth, but human worth is also respected
by allowing the putative victim to have the autonomy to choose to be
harmed. But any harm has to be reasonable. A person’s interest in human
dignity has to be balanced against her interest in autonomy.47 The human
dignity violation involved in inﬂicting actual bodily harm upon others is
not sufﬁcient to outweigh that person’s autonomy right. Therefore, con-
sent should provide a defense where the defendant has inﬂicted actual
bodily harm only on the consenting victim. Courts in other jurisdictions
have held that consent should be denied as defense only for grievous bodily
harm.48 That also is the position taken in this article.
Lawmakers’ deference to the medical profession has allowed the medical
profession to medicalize unnecessary harmful cosmetic surgery, not only
for adults, but also for minors. The aim here is to put forward a case for
invoking the criminal law to prevent surgeons from carrying out medical
45. In England and Wales, even suicide has been decriminalized. See § 2 of the Suicide
Act 1961, which targets harm to others instead of self-harm. Similarly, § 2 of the Female
Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (U.K.) makes it an offense for a person to assist a girl or adult
woman to mutilate her own genitalia. Self-harm is not criminalized, but assisting another to
harm herself is.
46. BAKER, supra note 14, at Ch. 23.
47. The links between autonomy and dignity are complex, but a deeper analysis of these
links is beyond the scope of this article. Cf. R.A. Duff,Harms andWrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 13 (2001).
48. See the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria inNeal v. The Queen [2011] V.S.C.
A. 172 at 62, where in applying the test formulated in the dissenting judgment of Lord Slynn
of Hadley in R. v. Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212, Redlich, J.J.A., and Kyrou, A.J.A., (Nettle, J.J.A.,
concurring) said: ‘‘The test of mere actual bodily harm has also been criticised in academic
writings and, as was pointed out by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R. v. Lee [2006] 3
N.Z.L.R. 42, 93–94 has in effect not been followed in a number of subsequent English
decisions.’’
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procedures that unnecessarily risk causing harm. In light of R. v. Brown,49
unnecessary nontherapeutic surgery that carries a high risk of resulting in
serious long-term harm for consenting adults is not in the public interest
and thus constitutes an aggravated criminal assault contrary to §§ 18, 20
and 47 of the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 (U.K).
In Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 6 of 1980), Lord Lane, C.J., said:
‘‘Nothing which we have said is intended to cast doubt upon the accepted
legality of properly conducted games and sports, lawful chastisement or
correction, reasonable surgical interference, dangerous exhibitions, etc. These
apparent exceptions can be justiﬁed as involving the exercise of a legal right,
in the case of chastisement or correction, or as needed in the public interest,
in the other cases’’ (emphasis added).50 The Law Lords in R. v. Brown
endorsed Lord Lane C.J.’s ‘‘reasonable surgery’’ defense.51 In R. v.
Brown,52 Lord Mustill said that consent was a defense to surgery where
the surgery constituted ‘‘proper medical treatment.’’ Lord Jauncey held that
the consent was a defense for, among other things, reasonable surgery:
Consent of the victim is no answer to anyone charged with the latter offense
or with a contravention of section 20 of the Offenses Against the Person Act
1861 unless the circumstances fall within one of the well known exceptions
such as organized sporting contests and games, parental chastisement or
reasonable surgery.53 [Emphasis added.]
In In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilization), Neill, L.J., said:
It is apparent therefore that the defense of consent is not a complete answer
if to give effect to such consent would be against the public interest. . . .Thus
it may be that in some future case the rule that a person may consent to any
49. [1994] 1 A.C. 212. See alsoCommonwealth v. Appleby (1980) 380Mass. 296; People v.
Samuels (1967) 250 Cal. App. 2d 501.
50. [1981] Q.B. 715 at 719.
51. [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
52. [1994] 1 A.C. 212 at 266, Lord Mustill said: ‘‘Many of the acts done by surgeons would
be very serious crimes if done by anyone else, and yet the surgeons incur no liability. Actual
consent, or the substitute for consent deemed by the law to exist where an emergency creates
a need for action, is an essential element in this immunity; but it cannot be a direct
explanation for it, since much of the bodily invasion involved in surgery lies well above any
point at which consent could even arguably be regarded as furnishing a defense. Why is this
so? The answer must in my opinion be that proper medical treatment, for which actual or
deemed consent is a prerequisite, is in a category of its own.’’ (Emphasis added.)
53. [1994] 1 A.C. 212 at 242. See also Lord Templeman’s comments at 231.
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operation on himself will require modiﬁcation if it were to appear that some
surgical procedure of an irreversible nature had been carried out not in the
course of the medical treatment of the person operated on or of some member of
his family54 but merely in return for money to meet some pressing ﬁnancial
need.55 [Emphasis added.]
One can think of plenty of hypotheticals where surgery is unlawful. For
example, consent will not provide a defense to a surgeon where she is
involved in nonlegitimate organ harvesting.56 An organ donor can consent
to having her organs removed after she is dead, but she cannot sell her
organs whilst she is alive, nor can she donate an organ when to do so would
result in her death. Since a person only has one liver, she would not be able
to donate a liver whilst alive, but she could donate one of her kidney’s to
her sister, if both her kidneys are healthy. A surgeon who illegally removes
an organ is more likely to be charged with a speciﬁc offense57 than with
aggravated assault. But there is no reason why a surgeon could not be
prosecuted for aggravated assault when she intentionally removes an organ
such as a kidney from a consenting victim when the surgeon knows that the
kidney is to be illegally sold to another,58 because such surgery would not
be reasonable surgery and thus would not come within the reasonable
surgery exception.
Similarly, if a surgeon were to remove a person’s hand to help him
perpetrate a fraud,59 he or she would be liable for one of the aggravated
forms of assault found in §§ 18, 20, or 47 of the Offense against the
Person Act 1861 (U.K.) since consent would provide no defense. Consent
provides no defense because the hand is not removed for a medical pur-
pose, nor is it removed as a matter of necessity to prevent a person
suffering Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) from risking graver
harm by trying to amputate it herself by lying her hand or arm on
54. For example, a genuine kidney donation.
55. [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at 29.
56. See Steven Swinford,Girl Smuggled into Britain to Have Her ‘‘Organs Harvested’’ (THE
LONDON TELEGRAPH, Oct. 18, 2013).
57. See § 33 of the Human Tissue Act 2004; likewise, the surgeon could be charged as an
accessory where she assists another to perpetrate the offense found in § 32 of the Act of 2004.
See also § 10 of the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013.
58. On the morality of organ markets, see MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY
OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS, TRANSPLANTATION, AND THE MARKET (2005).
59. State v. Bass (1961) 120 SE 2d 580.
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a railway line.60 If a person has attempted to amputate her own foot
because a doctor has previously refused to amputate it, the defense of
necessity could be raised: the lesser evil would be for the doctor to remove
the foot under controlled medical conditions.61
The general constraint is one of reasonableness, not one of necessity.
After all, some surgery will be reasonable even though it is not necessary,
such as minor cosmetic surgery on a consenting adult. Milder forms of
cosmetic surgery are likely to be treated as reasonable surgery because it
serves the end of allowing the consenter to ‘‘adorn’’ his or her body.62 If the
cosmetic surgery is not necessary to serve a therapeutic aim (e.g., to cure
a burn victim or to correct a growth or congenital abnormality, etc.), then it
has to be necessary to serve some other legitimate aim (e.g., a nontherapeu-
tic sterilization of a person with a severe mental incapacity would serve the
legitimate end of providing her with some sexual freedom).63
However, even unnecessary nontherapeutic surgery may be permissible
were it is reasonable in that it results only in ephemeral harm and in a long-
term beneﬁt for the consenter as might be the case where a person consents
to a nose job. Reasonableness would also depend on success rates. The
scientiﬁc evidence would have to demonstrate that the procedure is relatively
safe and rarely compromises the health or safety of the patient. It also should
60. Bayne and Levy argue, ‘‘if such patients are experiencing signiﬁcant distress as
a consequence of the rare psychological disorder named Body Integrity Identity Disorder
(BIID), such operations might be permissible.’’ There are three main disorders that cause
young people to desire that their limbs be removed: (1) Body Integrity Identity Disorder
involves the consenter not wanting her limbs because she has no awareness of them or
believes that they belong to another person. (2) Body Dysmorphic Disorder is a ‘‘condition
in which the individual believes, incorrectly, that a part of their body is diseased or
exceedingly ugly;’’ and therefore should be removed. (3) Apotemphilia. ‘‘Apotemnophiles
are sexually attracted to amputees, and sexually excited by the notion that they might
become amputees themselves.’’ Tim Bayne & Neil Levy, Amputees By Choice: Body Integrity
Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation, 22(1) J. APPLIED PHIL. 75 at 75–78 (2005).
61. Cf. People v. Brown (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 256. See also David Veale, Outcome of
Cosmetic Surgery and ‘‘DIY’’ Surgery in Patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder, PSYCHIATRIC
BULL. 218 (2000), where it is noted that some mentally disordered people have tried to
perform their own cosmetic surgery. See also BAKER, supra note 14, at 824–25; Theodore
Bennett, It’s But a Flesh Wound: Criminal Law and the Conceptualization of Healthy Limb
Amputation, 36 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 158 (2011).
62. R. v. Wilson [1997] Q.B. 47 at 50, where Russell, L.J., said that acts of violence
perpetrated for the sole purpose of adorning the victim could provide a defense.
63. In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilization) [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
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be demonstrated that it is routinely performed with negligible long-term
adverse outcomes. If the procedure results in twenty or thirty percent
of those having it suffering from harmful complications, then it would
not be reasonable for surgeons to perform it because the risk of harm is
high and the risk is not taken in an attempt to rid the patient of some
existing medical condition that is causing her harm. It is not a case of the
surgeon risking harm as the lesser of two evils. The patient is exposed to
the risk of being harmed purely to serve a nontherapeutic or other
unreasonable end.
A nose job (rhinoplasty) involves great violence (even when it is in-
tended to cure a genuine medical ailment), but it is carried out under
proven safe medical conditions that are designed both to limit the risk of
death or long-term injury and to minimize the pain of the operation and
the pain of recovery. Coupled with that, the procedure, if carried out
properly, should not result in any long-term harm. Generally, nose jobs
do not result in high rates of harmful complications, but there always will
be a percentage of putative patients who will have ongoing problems.
However, this is also the case with therapeutic surgery. Thus, the fact that
the complications relate to nontherapeutic surgery is probably not enough
to provide a strong harm justiﬁcation for criminalization.
The rate of complication also depends on the type of procedure per-
formed. Most Westerners have their nose size reduced, but in some
Eastern countries people have their nose size increased, which results in
more complications because implants are used to increase the nose size.64
Notwithstanding this, arguably rhinoplasty provides us with an example
of very violent nontherapeutic surgery that does not result in high rates of
complications after the putative patient has heeled following the initial
surgery. Therefore, it seems the courts would hold that it would be
reasonable and thus lawful for a consenting adult to have this kind of
surgery.
Whether or not such surgery is reasonable is a question of fact for a jury.
The jury is likely to accept that rhinoplasty is reasonable because the
violence (serious bodily harm is inﬂicted under controlled medical condi-
tions and is ephemeral) is a one-off harm that is aimed at providing a long-
term beneﬁt. The violence does not result in ongoing harmful side effects
64. SeeH.R. Jin et al., A Multicenter Evaluation of the Safety of Gore-Tex as an Implant in
Asian Rhinoplasty, 20 AM. J. RHINOLOGY 615 (2006).
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and thus seems to be reasonable nontherapeutic surgery. Does nonthera-
peutic rhinoplasty come within the medical exception? Or is it a case of
adornment? If it is performed merely to change the putative patient’s
appearance to suit his or her personal preferences, then it is a nonmedical
(nontherapeutic) procedure and, thus, cannot come within the medical
exception recognized in R. v. Brown.65 Instead, it would have to be brought
under the adornment exception set out in the English Court of Appeal
decision in R. v. Wilson.66
Generally, unnecessary nontherapeutic surgery that results in the puta-
tive patient suffering long-term harmful effects from the surgery is unrea-
sonable surgery. Unnecessary nontherapeutic surgery that carries grave
health risks is not lawful under R. v. Brown. It has been held for centuries
that ‘‘[c]onsent was only a limited defense . . . , because a man could not
lawfully consent to unusual violence, and if he asked another man to kill
him his request was no defense. It was, for the same reason, unlawful to
take a grave risk: as where the deceased requested a man to shoot at him to
test his armour, and the armour failed.’’67
Risk depends on the gravity of the harm involved and also on the
probability of the harm occurring. A high risk of trivial bodily harm result-
ing from a surgical procedure might be deemed to be a reasonable risk, but
a twenty percent chance of serious harm resulting from a surgical procedure
that is not a ‘‘necessity’’ would be an unreasonable risk. If twenty percent of
those having a particular procedure die or suffer serious bodily harm, then
it would be unreasonable surgery.68
65. [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
66. [1997] Q.B. 47 at 50 per Russell, L.J.
67. J.H. BAKER, THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 312 (1978); see R. v. Emmett
(1999) The Times, where the Court of Appeal held: ‘‘although consent might form
a defense in some circumstances, the risk of non temporary or permanent injury out-
weighed consent to sadomasochistic practices.’’ See also R. v. Lee [2006] 3 N.Z.L.R. 42 at
{ 208 passim.
68. R.A. Yoho et al., Review of the Liposuction, Abdominoplasty, and Face-Lift Mortality
and Morbidity Risk Literature, 31(7) DERMATOLOGIC SURGERY 733 (2005); Susan F. Ely et
al., Deaths Related to Liposuction, 340N. ENG. J. MED. 1471 (1999). There also can be other
nonfatal results that are very harmful. See Ali Rıza O¨rerog˘lu, Transient Leg Paralysis After
Abdominal Liposuction, 34(1) AESTHETIC SURGERY J. 193 (2014); see also How Cosmetic
Fillers May Cause Blindness (LIVE SCIENCE, Mar. 6, 2014) http://www.livescience.com/
43925-in-rare-cases-people-may-lose-eyesight-due-to-facial-enhancement.html.
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I I I . THE HARM IN SOME FORMS OF NONTHERAPEUT IC
COSMET IC SURGERY
There are many surgeries that result in harm. It is not possible to list or
analyze them all here. It is enough to analyze two examples. The analysis
below will analogize unlawful female genital mutilation with lawful labia-
plasty in an attempt to show that labiaplasty is a wrongful harm that is
lawful only because it has been medicalized by the medical profession. The
aim is to demonstrate that they both result in wrongful harm and thus both
warrant criminalization. There is a vast amount of literature substantiating
the case for criminalizing female genital mutilation, which cannot be sur-
veyed here. What is clear is that female genital mutilation met the wrongful
harm criteria for criminalization. It is not only harmful, but also wrong to
wantonly mutilate the genitals of another. It is accepted that the state had
legitimate justiﬁcations for criminalizing female genital mutilation. The
aim here is to show that those same moral justiﬁcations (wrongful harm)
support criminalizing harmful cosmetic surgery.
In many countries medical doctors continue to perform harmful female
genital mutilation procedures even though those procedures have been
proved to serve no medical purpose.69 The procedure is not therapeutic,
but to the contrary is physically harmful. It is performed to uphold an
antediluvian cultural ritual, not to provide therapy. Female genital muti-
lation (also called female circumcision) was criminalized because it not only
involves gross violence, even if that violence is sometimes carried out under
medical conditions, but also because it results in long-term health pro-
blems.70 It is a form of violence that has been scientiﬁcally and medically
proven to serve no medical purpose. There also is a wide body of medical
and feminist research that demonstrates that it is harmful.71 In the rare
69. The World Health Organization has a program aimed at dissuading medical pro-
fessionals from performing female genital mutilation. See Global Strategy to Stop Health-
care Providers from Performing Female Genital Mutilation (2010).
70. There are some treatments to reverse the harm, but that involves more surgery.
Furthermore, these procedures have a limited success rate. See Sarah Creighton et al.,
Reconstructive Surgery after Female Genital Mutilation, 380 The Lancet 1469 (2012).
71.Nahid Toubia, Female Circumcision as a Public Health Issue, 331(11) N. ENG. J. MED.
712–16 (1994); E. Banks, Female Genital Mutilation and Obstetric Outcome: WHO Collab-
orative Prospective Study in Six African Countries, 367 THE LANCET 1835 (2006).
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cases where it serves some medical purpose, the relevant statutory provi-
sions provide a medical purpose defense.72
Female circumcision involving inﬁbulations have long-term serious
health effects because they interfere with the victim’s menstrual and urine
ﬂow. In addition, ‘‘childbirth adds other risks for inﬁbulated women. . . . If
deinﬁbulation is not performed, exit of the fetal head may be obstructed
and strong contractions can lead to perineal tears.’’73 Female circumcision
is akin to unnecessary harmful cosmetic surgery because it aims to serve
some cultural norm that has no scientiﬁc relation to healthcare.
Female circumcision was criminalized in England and Wales in 2003.74
Since the law was enacted a surgeon and his accomplice have been charged
under § 1(1) of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 for performing
female genital mutilation surgery on a patient at the Whittington hospital
in London.75 It is an offense regardless of whether the circumcision is
performed by a qualiﬁed medical surgeon and regardless of whether the
victim is a consenting adult.76 The mirror provision in the United States
includes an age cap. 18 U.S. Code § 116 (Female Genital Mutilation)
provides: ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly
circumcises, excises, or inﬁbulates the whole or any part of the labia majora
or labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age
of 18 years shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.’’ The British Parliament decided that the harm involved in
female genital mutilation surgery was sufﬁciently serious to warrant
72. See §§ 1(2)(a) and (b) of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. The relevant
offense in the United States is found in 18 U.S.C.A. § 116. See also Joleen C. Lenihan, A
Physician’s Dilemma: Legal Ramiﬁcations of an Unorthodox Surgery, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
953 (1995); Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, Female Genital Surgeries: The Known, the Unknown,
and the Unknowable, 13 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 79 (1999).
73. Toubia, supra anote 71. See also Peggy Mulongo et al., Crossing Boarders: Discussing
the Evidence Relating to the Mental Health Needs of Women Exposed to Female Genital
Mutilation, INTERNAT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 1 (2014); Katharina Teufel &
Daniela Marianne Do¨rﬂer, Female Genital Circumcision/Mutilation: Implications for Female
Urogynaecological Health, 24(12) INTERNAT’L UROGYNECOLOGY J. 2021 (2013).
74. § 1 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003.
75. FGM: UK’s First Prosecutions Announced, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. WKLY. (Mar. 22,
2014), where it was reported that nearly 4,000 women and girls have been treated for female
genital mutilation in London hospitals alone since 2009.
76. The legislation speciﬁcally refers to girls, but § 6(1) of the Female Genital Mutilation
Act 2003 provides: ‘‘Girl includes woman.’’
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excluding consent from operating as a defense for a surgeon carrying out
this kind of surgical procedure, even where the consent is from an
informed adult.
Now let us consider an example of unnecessary surgical harm that has
not been criminalized because it has been medicalized. Genital cosmetic
surgery is widely practiced in the United Kingdom. Women and young
girls, as young as eleven, have been seeking genital cosmetic surgery for the
purpose of having a ‘‘designer vagina.’’77 Genital cosmetic surgery is per-
formed not only on consenting adults, but also on minors. The most
common procedure is labiaplasty. A body of compelling medical evidence
demonstrates its long-term adverse health consequences.78 It also has been
demonstrated that in nearly all cases it is not carried out to cure a genuine
health problem, but instead to serve the subjective preferences of the
(putative patient) victim79 or her family.80
At team of leading medical experts have reported:
The absence of a lower age limit for any of the female genital cosmetic
surgery (FGCS) procedures is most disturbing of all. In the past 6 years, 343
labiaplasties were performed in the UK NHS on girls aged 14 or under. The
77. N.S. Crouch et al., Clinical Characteristics of Well Women Seeking Labial Reduction
Surgery: A Prospective Study, 118(12) BJOG: AN INTERNAT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAE-
COLOGY 1507 at 1510 (2011), where it is reported: ‘‘Younger girls may not be able to
understand the potential long-term risks of surgery on sensation or be able to appropriately
weigh up the risks and beneﬁts of such an unstudied procedure. . . . If anything, scientiﬁc
studies suggest that genital surgery is associated with reduced sensitivity, which could affect
sexual function. Recently, oestrogen receptors have been demonstrated at the free edge of
the labia minora, which would be disrupted during surgery.’’ It also was reported at 1507
that ‘‘[d]espite reassurances that their labia were normal, 40% of the participants remained
keen to pursue surgery by any other available route.’’
78. See Adams, supra note 9 at 52, where it is reported: ‘‘This procedure should not be
carried out in women younger than 18 years of age because the shape of their external
genitalia is still changing during puberty.’’
79. B.E. Hayden et al., Labial Reduction in Adolescent Population—A Case Series Study,
22(1) J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 53 (2009), where it is reported that most
of these surgeries are carried for cosmetic purposes where the minor is embarrassed of her
natural state. See also R. Bramwell et al., Expectations and Experience of Labial Reduction:
a Qualitative Study, 114(12) BJOG: AN INTERNAT’L J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1493
(2007).
80. For example, harmful male circumcision is performed on infants to satisfy the
religious beliefs of their parents. On the ethics of male circumcision, see Abbie J. Chessler,
Justifying the Unjustiﬁable: Rite v. Wrong, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 555 (1997).
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indications for surgery in this group of children are unknown, but labial
anomalies requiring surgical interventions are extremely rare. In addition,
signiﬁcant numbers of labiaplasties on girls under 18 years of age are reported
in the medical literature with publications dwelling speciﬁcally on labial
reductions in adolescents for hypertrophy or asymmetry of the labia minora.
In a recent observational study of referral patterns, girls as young as 9 years
with normal labia had presented for labiaplasty. The labia minora change as
part of normal pubertal growth with development completed as the indi-
vidual approaches adulthood. Given the fact that anatomy continues to
change throughout the lifespan, the younger a girl begins her FGCS jour-
ney, the higher the number of lifetime operations and the greater and more
multiple the risks.81
Surgeons motivated by monetary compensation seem to be willing to
perform these harmful operations as a quick ﬁx for self-esteem issues, when
psychological counseling would provide a harmless cure. There may be rare
cases where labiaplasty is a medical necessity, but the empirical evidence
demonstrates that most cases do not involve medical necessity.
There are many other examples of nontherapeutic cosmetic procedures
that have high rates of long-term complications, such as breast augmenta-
tions,82 but space constraints do not allow for a detailed discussion of them
all. Measuring harm is difﬁcult: We have to not only consider the inten-
tional violence involved in surgery, which is immediately harmful, but also
the risk of long-term harm that the particular surgery carries. There are two
sets of risks at play: (1) the risk of complications during surgery, and (2) the
risk of complications following surgery. But there is only one initial act of
intentional violence, which is the surgery itself.
All surgery including unnecessary cosmetic surgery has inherent risks.
There is a risk that the surgeon will not be properly qualiﬁed or the clinic
not properly equipped, but the focus here is only on the risks that are
involved when the surgeon is qualiﬁed and when the surgical operation
takes place in a properly equipped clinic.83 Even where the surgeon is
81. See also Lih-Mei Liao et al., An Analysis of the Content and Clinical Implications of
Online Advertisements for Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery, B.M.J. OPEN (2012) (2: e001908
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2012-001908).
82. For a discussion of the harms involved, seeDiana Zuckerman, Teenagers and Cosmetic
Surgery: Focus on Breast Augmentation and Liposuction, 43(4) J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 318
(2008).
83. Cf. People v. Brown (2001) 91 Cal. App. 4th 256, where the surgeon lacked proper
qualiﬁcations and operated without proper facilities. Nigel Mercer, the President of the
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qualiﬁed and is operating in excellent clinical conditions, there are inherent
risks in all forms of surgery. Surgery not only involves the violent act of
cutting and incising, tearing, disjointing, and so on, but also the risk that
those acts, even though performed under the safest medical conditions
available, could result in the patient dying on the operating table or suf-
fering from complications.
During surgery the patient might suffer from profuse bleeding or from
an adverse or insufﬁcient reaction to the anesthesia. Coupled with that, the
doctor might accidentally or negligently cause unintended harm. Following
the surgery the patient might suffer from an infection, blood clots, pain
from the operation, and so on. These risks might be acceptable when
a person has to take the risk for necessary medical surgery that is aimed
at serving a greater therapeutic end, but they seem unacceptable risks for
a person to be exposed to for the purpose of having unnecessary nonther-
apeutic surgery.
There is also the risk of complications following the relevant surgery.
Some of these complications will relate directly to the surgery, others will
result months or years later. The harmfulness of the complications will
depend on the particular complication and surgical procedure that caused
it. Some procedures result in fairly harmful complications and also have
high rates of these complications. For example, it has been reported that
breast augmentations require follow-up procedures and result in higher
suicide rates.84 The short-term and also long-term complication rates
for some forms of surgery are very high.85 The U.S. Food and Drug
British Association of Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons, provided a warning of the dangers of
unqualiﬁed cosmetic surgeons. See Nigel Mercer, Dangers of ‘‘Lax’’ Cosmetic Surgery Rules,
(BBC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2010).
84. Elizabeth Morgan, Suicide After Breast Augmentation, 19(3) EPIDEMIOLOGY 520
(2008).
85. P.S. Walker et al., Natrelle Saline-ﬁlled Breast Implants: a Prospective 10-Year Study,
29(1) AESTHETIC SURGERY J. 19 (2009); STUART BONDURANT ET AL., SAFETY OF SILI-
CONE BREAST IMPLANTS BY COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS
(2000); Marcia Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of
Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1513 (1996); Ian C.
Hoppe et al., Case Report: Localized Scleroderma of the Breast After Saline Implant Rupture,
32(2) EUR. J. PLASTIC SURGERY 127 (2011); Marisa Marques et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of
Breast Capsule Contracture Rates in Cosmetic and Reconstructive Cases, 126(3) PLASTIC &
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 769 (2010); Neal Handel et al., Breast Implant Rupture: Causes,
Incidence, Clinical Impact, and Management, 132(5) PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY
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Administration has reported, ‘‘Breast implants are not lifetime devices. The
longer a woman has . . . implants, the more likely she is to experience com-
plications. One in 5 patients (20%) who received implants for breast aug-
mentation will need them removed within 10 years of implantation.’’86
A harm analysis requires the lawmaker to consider both the frequency
and gravity of the complications from unnecessary nontherapeutic cos-
metic surgery. Breast augmentations result in a high rate of complications,
and the complications are of a serious nature. It is difﬁcult to see how
allowing a surgeon to carry out nontherapeutic breast augmentation pro-
cedures can be reconciled with common law authorities such as R. v.
Brown87 and Bass v. State,88 given the high rate of complications and given
the gravity of the harm that is inherent in those complications; a fortiori in
the context of minors receiving such surgery.
It is difﬁcult to see how the violent amputation involved in labiaplas-
ties89 can be reconciled with R. v. Brown or Bass v. State, given that it has
been medically proven that ‘‘[t]he younger a girl begins her labiaplasty
trajectory, the higher the number of operations over her life time and the
greater the risk of scarring and sensitivity loss.’’90 Space does not allow for
a more detailed harms analysis, but I think sufﬁcient evidence has been
cited for a moral philosopher to work from the presumption that if such
procedures are harmful, unnecessary, and a wrongful violation of the con-
senter’s dignity, criminalization is appropriate. These forms of nonthera-
peutic cosmetic surgery are harmful, both immediately and in the patient’s
future.
Per contra, reasonable adornment involving one-off violence that does
not result in any long-term harmful complications might be treated as
1128 (2013); P. Fryzek et al., Local Complications and Subsequent Symptom Reporting among
Women with Cosmetic Breast Implants, 107(1) PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 214
(2001).
86.U.S. Food &Drug Administration, ‘‘FDA Provides Updated Safety Data on Silicone
Gel-ﬁlled Breast Implants,’’ (News Release), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm260235.htm.
87. [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
88. (1961) 120 SE 2d 580.
89. In the amputation technique or ‘‘labial trim,’’ the edge of the labium is cut out and
the edges oversewn. See British Society for Paediatric & Adolescent Gynecology, Labial
Reduction Surgery (Labiaplasty) on Adolescents (Position Statement, Oct. 2013).
90. British Society for Pediatric & Adolescent Gynecology Labial Reduction Surgery
(Labiaplasty) on Adolescents (Position Statement, Oct. 2013).
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lawful, even though it involves ephemeral serious bodily harm that is
inﬂicted in controlled medical conditions. For example, since rhinoplasty
has minimal adverse complications and a good recovery rate, it might be
treated as lawful even though it involves ephemeral serious bodily harm.
The same cannot be said of adornment procedures that have high rates of
complications and frequently result in harm over a longer period of time, as
seems to be the case with breast augmentation procedures and labial reduc-
tion surgeries.
In the English Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Wilson,91 a husband
used a hot knife to brand his initials on his wife’s buttocks because she
asked him to brand her. Wilson was charged with assault occasioning
bodily harm contrary to § 47 of the Offenses Against the Person Act
1861 (U.K.), but his conviction was quashed on appeal. The appeal suc-
ceeded because his actions were held to come within the purview of the
recognized exceptions laid down in R. v. Brown. The English Court of
Appeal held that the branding was comparable to tattooing and thus was
a form of reasonable adornment.
It seems clear that if the branding had been un-reasonable adornment,
the decision in R. v. Wilson would have been different. So what made it
reasonable? The Court does not provide any insights, but it is arguable that
reasonable adornment is a body adornment procedure that is not unrea-
sonably dangerous in that it carries a low probability of resulting in serious
complications in the longer term. A branding is likely to heal within a weak
and thereafter cause the person branded no further complications. It does
not pose a risk to the life of the person receiving the brand, nor does it risk
causing him or her serious injury. It is one-off violence that results in no
long-term harm, but allows the receiver the autonomy to chose to adorn
him or herself for the long-term.
The wrongful harm criteria are difﬁcult to apply because surgeons tend
to argue that the harmful surgery is needed because the putative patient will
suffer psychological distress if it is not provided. Medical necessity provides
a defense, but this defense only applies where the surgery is carried out
as a matter of medical/therapeutic necessity.92 Physicians should not be
allowed to medicalize gross harm that serves no medical or therapeutic
91. [1997] Q.B. 47.
92. ‘‘In general, a serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
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purpose. Surgeons and other medical practitioners do not have carte
blanche to inﬂict harm on others under the disguise of medicine. The
medicine must be therapeutic and necessary or otherwise come within
the reasonable adornment exception. In addition, the general defense of
necessity would cover nontherapeutic sterilizations on those suffering
from a mental disability, for example. Likewise, since sterilizations can
be carried out safely with a low rate of long-term harmful effects, a person
should have the freedom to have one. In such a case, a person’s auton-
omous decision to have such a procedure enhances her dignity rather than
degrades it.
It is arguable that adults should have the freedom to have some unnec-
essary cosmetic surgery, so long as the surgery only risks ephemeral harm
and serves the utility of being either medicine or ‘‘reasonable’’ adornment.
Adornment could cover a one-off procedure that results in long-term
adornment, where that procedure has minimal long-term adverse health
effects for the putative patient. But minors should not be allowed to have
unnecessary cosmetic surgery under any circumstances. A wealth of exam-
ples might be provided, but the few examples presented are sufﬁcient for
making the case for criminalizing unnecessary cosmetic surgery when it
carries a high risk of serious harm.
The medical profession has medicalized these unnecessary procedures by
claiming they are necessary for the victim’s psychological health. If this is
the case, then the burden is on the medical profession to prove that invasive
surgery is the only available treatment and that it is the lesser of two evils. If
a person is suffering mental anguish because of her body image, then the
appropriate medical response would be to provide psychological counsel-
ing, not invasive surgery involving serious bodily harm and long-term
harmful complications.
The medical profession has the burden of proving that psychological
counseling does not work and that the harm to the victim would be greater
without the invasive surgery than with it. It is submitted that such a burden
is not likely to be satisﬁed, because the medical science points in the other
direction. The medical science demonstrates that these invasive procedures
are not only harmful in the short-term (the surgery itself involves serious
violence and immense pain in the short-term), but also expose the victims
the need for a doctor’s attention.’’’ Soneeya v. Spencer (2012) 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, at 242, per
Tauro, J. See also Sundstrom v. Frank (2007) 630 F. Supp. 2d 974 at 978.
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to long-term complications of a very harmful nature. There is a wealth of
evidence to support the claim that labiaplasty and breast enlargement
surgery are very rarely needed as a matter of medical necessity, and that
they are nearly always provided in circumstances where they are not med-
ically necessary. In these cases psychological counseling would provide an
effective alternative. Psychological counseling might not be one hundred
percent effective in every case, but the evidence suggests that invasive
surgery is far less effective. Physicians should not be allowed to do more
harm than good with the ulterior aim of making money, which is what they
do when they provide surgery to satisfy a child’s naı¨ve whims to have
a certain physical image.
A. The Limits of Consent as a Defense for Harm to Minors
If an adult cannot consent to the sort of wrongful harm that is involved in
unnecessary nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery that carries a high risk of
serious harm, a fortiori a minor cannot consent to such harm. The decision
to criminalize cosmetic surgery that unnecessarily risks causing long-term
harm to minors does not rest simply on their having less capacity to make
an informed decision about whether or not to have the surgery; it also rests
on the public interest justiﬁcation93 for denying consent as a defense where
the consenter is a member of a vulnerable group in our society. The core
justiﬁcation for criminalizing those who perform unnecessary cosmetic
surgery on minors is that such surgery involves wrongful harm-doing. A
minor’s vulnerability and mental immaturity are additional factors that
lend weight to the case for using the criminal law to prevent surgeons from
performing such procedures on minors.
It was recognized nearly two hundred years ago that minors achieve
varying degrees of capacity.94 It is true that there is no clear line between
minor and adult, so an arbitrary legal line has to be drawn to protect the
majority. It does not matter that some minors are mentally mature at the
93. Public interest has long provided a justiﬁcation for state intervention; seeMatthew v.
Ollerton (1693) Comb. 218, where it was said: ‘‘The defendant may refer to the plaintiff
himself, if he will; but license to beat me is void, because ’tis against the peace.’’
94. See R. v. Smith (1845) 1 Cox C.C. 260; R. v. Gorrie (1919) 83 J.P. 136; Guarro v. U.S.
(1956) 237 F. 2d 578; Com. v. Feijoo (1995) 646 N.E. 2d 118. ‘‘A six-year-old girl is incapable,
in law, of giving her consent to indecent liberties taken with her.’’ Lenahan v. Common-
wealth (1946) 301 Ky. 714. See also the Sexual Offenses Act 2003 U.K.).
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age of 17, while some adults are mentally immature at the age of 25. The law
aims to protect the majority, and the majority of those aged 17 and under
are less mature than those aged 18 and above. A blanket ban against all those
between the ages of 16 and 18 being allowed to consent to unnecessary
harmful cosmetic surgery rests not only on their diminished capacity, but
also on a policy choice to protect impressionable and vulnerable minors
from being subjected to the irreversible harm that is likely to result from
their making a decision that they might not otherwise make, but for their
impressionable age. ‘‘Youth is easily deceived because it is quick to hope,’’
said Aristotle. Perhaps no person’s decisions are more inﬂuenced by peer
pressure than those of a teenager. Peer pressure and impressionability leads
even mature minors to make regrettable and bad decisions. They tend to
take risks that would not necessarily be taken by adults.95 When it can be
demonstrated that the planned surgery serves no therapeutic end and is
potentially very harmful, there seems to be no great restriction upon the
liberty of the minor by having a blanket ban against such surgery for
minors. The evidence would have to show that the planned surgery is
potentially harmful and serves no therapeutic end. Such an approach has
been adopted in the state of Queensland in Australia.96
It is absurd that in England andWales a minor cannot consent to having
a tattoo,97 but she can consent to, inter alia, having invasive surgery to
augment her breasts or harmful nontherapeutic labiaplasty.98 In Burrell v.
Harmer99 a tattooist tattooed two boys aged 12 and 13, causing their arms to
become inﬂamed and painful. The magistrates convicted him of an assault
occasioning actual bodily harm, rejecting his defense that the boys con-
sented on the ground that they did not understand the nature of the act;
and the conviction was upheld on appeal. These boys did not expect the
painful result. But it is difﬁcult to see how the doctrine of consent can
95. Research shows that teenagers are more likely than adults to take risks. See Laurence
Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence New Perspectives From Brain and Behavioral Science,
16(2) CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 55 (2007).
96. See § 213B of the Pubic Health Act 2005. See also Dan O’Connor, A Choice to Which
Adolescents Should not be Exposed: Cosmetic Surgery as Satire, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
157 (2012).
97. § 1 of the Tattooing of Minors Act 1969, applied in Harvie v. Stewart (2010) G.W.D.
27-533.
98. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] A.C. 112.
99. [1967] Crim. L.R. 169.
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rationally distinguish between a cosmetic surgeon who performs cosmetic
surgery that risks unnecessary harm and a tattooist, and equally hard to
imagine that the courts can continue to allow harmful unnecessary non-
therapeutic surgery to go unregulated.
A surgical operation on the body of a minor is a criminal battery, even if
it has a good result for the victim,100 unless the patient or some authorized
person consents to it on her behalf.101 This is recognized both in the
United States and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, § 8 of
the Family Law Reform Act 1969 allows a minor over the age of 16 to
consent to medical treatment without her parent’s permission, but the
consent must be informed and genuine.102 If the minor has not reached
the age of 16, consent without her parents’ input would be valid only if she
satisﬁes the ‘‘mature minor’’ test.103 When it is in the best interests of the
minor to receive medical treatment,104 other interested parties could apply
to the court to seek a declaration to ensure that it is lawful to provide the
treatment without the consent of the minor and her parents.105 In Re E (A
Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)106 an English court held that it
was lawful for the doctors to give the minor a blood transfusion, even
though neither the child nor his parents wanted him to have it. The child
would need to be within the jurisdiction of the court before it could make
such an order.107 Generally, the courts have an inherent jurisdiction,108
100. R. v. Brown [1994] 1 A.C. 212. See also Bass v. State (1961) 120 SE 2d 580; People v.
Kevorkian (2001) 248 Mich. App. 373; Commonwealth v. Appleby (1980) 380 Mass. 296;
People v. Samuels (1967) 250 Cal. App. 2d 501.
101. Younts v. St. Francis Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. (1970) 205 Kan. 292.
102. For a penetrating discussion of the law, see Stephen Gilmore & Jonathan Herring,
‘‘No’’ is the Hardest Word: Consent and Children’s Autonomy, 23(1) CHILD & FAM. Q. 3 (2011).
103. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] A.C. 112.
104. Lambert v. Wicklund (1997) 520 U.S. 292.
105. This is the law in both England and in most of the United States. In Bellotti v. Baird
(1979), 443 U.S. 622 at 648, it was said: ‘‘If, all things considered, the court determines that
an abortion is in the minor’s best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any
parental involvement.’’ For the position in England and Wales, see Gillick v. West Norfolk
and Wisbech AHA [1986] A.C. 112.
106. [1994] 5 Med. L.R. 73.
107. The law is essentially the same in the United States. See San Joaquin County
Human Services Agency v. Marcus W. (2010) 185 Cal. App. 4th 182; J.N. v. Superior Court
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 523.
108. DL v. A Local Authority [2012] 3 W.L.R. 1439. In Earl of Shaftsbury v. Shaftsbury
(1725) Gilb. Ch. 172 at 173–74, it was said: ‘‘But the Crown has another Jurisdiction, and
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which allows them to make a declaration that a proposed operation is in
a patient’s best interests. In Matter of Grady, it was said:
The parens patriae power of our courts derives from the inherent equitable
authority of the sovereign to protect those persons within the state who
cannot protect themselves because of an innate legal disability. While tra-
ditionally used to protect the economic and property interests of the legally
disabled, it has also been invoked to protect personal rights. . . . Parens
patriae jurisdiction has been invoked in cases involving substituted consent
for medical procedures. The most common of these occurs when a court
authorizes a blood transfusion over the objections of an injured or sick
child’s parents. Occasionally courts have authorized substituted consent for
an incompetent adult to undergo medical treatment.109
Where a minor is a ward of the court or of the state, the court will have
jurisdiction to authorize medical treatment. Wardship is a legal mechanism
that allows the courts to exercise parens patriae powers in relation to min-
ors.110 As a general rule in the absence of an emergency or unanticipated
conditions arising during surgery, a physician or surgeon must obtain the
consent of the patient before treating or operating on her. If the patient is
incapable of consenting, then consent must be obtained from a court or
a person who is legally authorized to consent on the patient’s behalf.111
The British Law Commission proposed ‘‘to enact special rules relating to
consent purportedly given by persons under 18 or with mental disabilities
and suggested a broadening of the type of conduct that may nullify con-
sent. It also proposed that the consent of persons under 18 to any level of
intentionally inﬂicted injuries for sexual, religious or spiritual purposes
should not in any circumstances be treated as a valid consent’’ (emphasis
added).112 Nontherapeutic surgery that risks unnecessary harm seems to
that is as Pater Patriœ, as a Father over his Children. . . .The King has a Right to take Care
of Infants, Lunaticks, and Ideots, that cannot take Care of themselves; and this Care cannot
be exercised otherwise than by appointing them proper Curators or Committees. . . .Now
as the King has the Protection of Infants, I don’t see any other Protection can be, than by
assigning them their Guardians; and where should that Protection be exercised, but in that
Court where Care is taken of all Persons under natural Disabilities?’’ See also Cary v. Bertie
(1696) 2 Vern. 333 at 342.
109. (1981) 85 N.J. 235 at 259.
110. In re N. (Infants) [1967] Ch. 512.
111. In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilization) [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
112. R. v. Lee [2006] 3 N.Z.L.R. 42 at { 228, citing Law Commission for England and
Wales, Criminal Law: Consent in the Criminal Law (L.C.C.P. 139, 1995) at {{ 10.1–10.15.
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be an area where consent from a person under the age of 18 years should
be deemed to be invalid consent, even if it is technically valid because the
mature minor understands the implications of her decision. The majority
of the states in the United States require adolescents to be 18 and over
before they can give valid medical consent. It is not proposed that the
mature minor test be abandoned for harm prevention decisions such as
the decision to have necessary medical treatment, because in practice, when
the test is applied in controversial medical cases, ‘‘parental consent’’ and
‘‘mature minor’’ consent is subject to judicial scrutiny. Coupled with this,
such decisions are aimed at preventing harm, not at unnecessarily risking harm.
More generally, if the court concludes that the minor’s refusal to have
necessary medical treatment is likely to harm her, then it is likely to hold
that such a decision is irrational and therefore is not a decision that a mature
minor would make.113 In everyday life minors routinely consent to have
medical treatment and also to have nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery that
risks unnecessary harm without their decisions114 being subjected to judi-
cial scrutiny. In most cases, cosmetic surgeons have treated parental
approval as being sufﬁcient. However, sometimes parents, because of their
own insecurities, will be responsible for forcing their children to have
unnecessary (harmful) cosmetic surgery.115 Thus, a blanket ban is needed
to protect children not only from their own foolish decisions, but also from
See alsoMichele Deitch et al., Seventeen going on Eighteen: An Operational and Fiscal Analysis
of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2012).
113. Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1994] 5 Med. L.R. 73. Analo-
gously, in In Re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilization) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 at 64, Lord Brandon said:
‘‘What is required from the court is rather an order which establishes by judicial process
(the ‘third opinion’ so aptly referred to by Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R.) whether
the proposed operation is in the best interests of the patient and therefore lawful, or not in
the patient’s best interests and therefore unlawful.’’ See alsoMatter of Schiller (1977) 148N.J.
Super. 168 (where the court authorized the amputation of a leg). For a comprehensive digest
of the law in the United States, see Power of Court or Other Public Agency to Order Medical
Treatment over Parental Religious Objections for Child Whose Life is not Immediately
Endangered, 21 A.L.R. 5th 248 (2014); Medical Practitioner’s Liability for Treatment Given to
Child Without Parent’s Consent, 67 A.L.R. 4th 511 (2014).
114. ‘‘What may seem the most unusual ﬁgure for British audiences are the number of
teenagers getting treated. Although it’s only 2% of the total, that’s still 230,617 procedures in
a year.’’ U.S. Plastic Surgery Statistics: Chins, Buttocks and Breasts up, Ears down, (THE
GUARDIAN, Datablog, Apr. 19, 2012).
115. Alicia Ouellette, Eyes Wide Open: Surgery to Westernize the Eyes of an Asian Child,
39(1) HASTINGS CENTRE REP. 15 at 16 (2009).
618 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 17 | NO . 4 | FALL 2014
foolish decisions made by their parents. A parent cannot authorize her
14-year-old to purchase alcohol or to smoke cigarettes, so why should she
be able to authorize nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery that involves a high
risk of harming her child? As far as genuine medical consent is concerned,
parental consent is more likely to have a harm prevention rationale and,
therefore, is not as controversial. A blanket ban against nontherapeutic
cosmetic surgery is needed to prevent either parental or mature minor
consent being used to make such surgery permissible.116
What is being proposed is that the mature minor test be abandoned for
cases involving unnecessary nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery that risks
harm. The mature minor test has been the subject of sustained judicial117
and academic criticism.118 Its use to allow minors to be put in a position
where they have to choose whether or not to have unnecessary cosmetic
surgery that carries a risk of causing them permanent injury is unaccept-
able. Genuine medicine is different since the minor is put in the position
where she has to choose, because of a chance medical condition. When
a ‘‘mature minor’’ has to choose whether or not to have necessary medical
treatment to save her life or to cure some greater harm, it is not objection-
able to let her have as much input as possible. Similarly, where a mature
116.Mark J. Cherry, Ignoring the Data and Endangering Children: Why the Mature Minor
Standard for Medical Decision Making Must be Abandoned, 38(3) J. MED. PHILOS. 315 at 323
(2013).
117. See Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2455 at 2469, where Kagan, J. (delivering the
opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, J.J., joined)
said: ‘‘But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions
for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. . . .Although
we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we
require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’’ See also Liao, supra note 81; U.S.
v. Shill (2014) 740 F. 3d 1347 at 1356; People v. Willis (2013) 997N.E. 2d 947 at 959; Graham
v. Florida (2010) 130 S.Ct. 2011; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 125 S.Ct. 1183; In re Alatriste (2013)
163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748.
118. Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917 (2009);
Ruben C. Gur, Brain Maturation and Its Relevance to Understanding Criminal Culpability of
Juveniles, 7 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 292 (2005); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah Yurgelun-
Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 32;
Christopher Thompson, The Development of Decision Making Capacities in Children and
Adolescents: Psychological and Neurological Perspectives and Their Implications for Juvenile
Defendants, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 173. (2009)
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minor makes a harm prevention decision, such as the decision to purchase
prophylactics to avoid contracting sexually transmitted diseases, there is
nothing objectionable about allowing her to make this sort of decision. If
her parents are involved, because of embarrassment, she may be deterred
from making a decision that is designed to prevent her from being harmed.
This is very different from letting her make a borderline autonomous
decision that unnecessarily exposes her to the risk of suffering harm that
serves no reasonable objective.
Courts and legislatures in the United States have accepted that the
scientiﬁc evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that there is a difference
in the maturity of a mature minor and an adult.119 The United States
Supreme Court has gone as far as accepting that a person’s age could impact
her degree of culpability. In the United Kingdom, Parliament has held that
those between the ages of 16 and 18 cannot give a valid consent to sexual
intercourse where the other party is in a position of trust, as is the case
where the other party is her school teacher.120
In taking this step, the Parliament of the United Kingdom seems to
accept that those aged between 16 and 18 are not sufﬁciently mature to give
valid consent when they are under the inﬂuence of a person who might
have more than normal inﬂuence. Invaliding the sexual consent of 16- or
17-year-olds who consent to have sexual relations with their schoolteachers
rests on the rationale that those under 18 lack full capacity to make a fully
119. Roper v. Simmons (2005) 125 S.Ct. 1183 at 1195, where Kennedy, J., said: ‘‘Three
general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile of-
fenders cannot with reliability be classiﬁed among the worst offenders. First, as any parent
knows and as the scientiﬁc and sociological studies the respondent and his amici cite
tend to conﬁrm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are
found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and deci-
sions.’ . . . (‘Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult’). It
has been noted that ‘adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of
reckless behavior.’ . . . In recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of
juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on
juries, or marrying without parental consent. See Appendixes B–D, infra.’’ See alsoWilliam J.
Katt, Roper and the Scientiﬁc Amicus, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 253 (2009).
120. § 21 of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003 (U.K.) ‘‘deﬁnes ‘positions of trust’ for the
purposes of sections 16 to 19 of the Act as covering relationships such as teacher and pupil or
doctor and patient.’’ R. v. McNally [2014] 2 W.L.R. 200 at 212. See also BAKER, supra note
14, at { 10-041.
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independent decision.121 If the same student were to have an affair with
a university professor a year after leaving school, there would be no criminal
liability for the professor, notwithstanding the ‘‘position of trust’’ issue,
because Parliament deems that 18-year-olds have sufﬁcient capacity to
choose whom to have an affair with, even where there may be a power
imbalance in the relationship. A similar situation is when an adult secretary
has an affair with his or her boss.
In State v. Windom, Jones, J., said:
The U.S. Supreme Court’s views align with the consensus emerging
in the scholarly literature that adolescents are not as able as adults to act
responsibly. . . .Their ability to think logically deteriorates, however, in
emotionally charged or stressful situations. Further, ‘‘[e]ven though ado-
lescents, by age sixteen, exhibit intellectual abilities comparable with adults,
they do not develop the psycho-social maturity, ability to exercise self-
control, and competence to make adult-quality choices until their early
twenties.’’122
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the scientiﬁc
and medical literature123 on the subject of adolescent capacity demon-
strates that adolescents are inherently less mature than adults in ways that
require them to be protected from some of their own decisions. The
conclusion of the Supreme Court of the United States marks a departure
from the cases advocating the mature minor doctrine. The mature minor
doctrine is used to deem that teenagers have the same mental capacity as
adults and thus should be given the same freedom as an adult to make life
choices. The mature minor test allows minors to be treated as though they
have the same capacity as an experienced adult when it comes to making
121. R. v. Lamb [2007] EWCA Crim. 1766; R. v. Lister [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 69; R. v.
Healy [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 105.
122. (2011) 150 Idaho 873 at 888.
123. Ana S. Iltis, Parents, Adolescents, and Consent for Research Participation, 38(3) J.
MED. & PHIL. 334 (2013); Evan A. Wilhelms & Valerie F. Reyna, Fuzzy Trace Theory
and Medical Decisions by Minors: Differences in Reasoning between Adolescents and Adults,
38(3) J. MED. & PHIL. 268 (2013); Brian C. Partridge, The Mature Minor: Some Critical
Psychological Reﬂections on the Empirical Bases, 38(3) J. MED. & PHIL. 283 (2013);
Rachelle Barina & Jeffrey P. Bishop, Maturing the Minor, Marginalizing the Family: On
the Social Construction of the Mature Minor, 38(3) J. MED. & PHIL. 300 (2013).
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decisions about whether or not to have necessary medical treatment. It also
has been used to protect their sexual autonomy.124
If the mature minor standard for medical decision making is question-
able in the context of genuine harm prevention oriented medical decision
making, a fortiori it is questionable for nontherapeutic (harmful) cosmetic
surgery decision making. An additional and related constraint is vulnera-
bility: The bottom line is that children belong to a vulnerable class in our
society and thus should not be put in a position where they have to make
a decision about whether or not to have unnecessary nontherapeutic cos-
metic surgery that is likely to result in long-term harmful consequences. In
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons,125 Kennedy, J.,
cited science and social science reports that supported his conclusion that
‘‘juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative inﬂuences and
outside pressures, including peer pressure.’’126 The problem has been exac-
erbated by the cosmetic surgery industry, whose advertizing targets people
who have certain insecurities by showing before and after images and by
presenting the after images as normal.127
Nonetheless, it has not been my aim to make a case for abandoning the
mature minor test altogether. That is a more general debate that goes
124. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] A.C. 112. Some academics have
questioned its sufﬁciency as a basis for justifying sexual choices made by minors. See Jennifer
A. Drobac & Leslie A. Hulvershorn, The Neurobiology of Decision Making in High Risk
Youth & the Law of Consent to Sex, 17(3) NEW CRIM. L. REV. 502–51 (2014).
125. (2005) 125 S.Ct. 1183 at 1195.
126. See also Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents’ Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their
Decisions to Seek Health Care, 273(24) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1913 (1995).
127. Franklin G. Miller et al., Cosmetic Surgery and the Internal Morality of Medicine, 9(3)
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 353 at 362 (2000), where it is observed: ‘‘The more
extreme ads for cosmetic surgery convey the message that the models shown in the ads
represent the standard of beauty to which all sensible people should aspire, and that these
models have achieved that standard of beauty precisely because they have themselves
submitted to cosmetic surgery (perhaps numerous times). By promoting disease and thus
stimulating demand for cosmetic surgery, such advertisements clearly violate the internal
morality of medicine.’’ Analogously, see the discussion in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy (2012) 127 S.Ct. 2489 at 2495, where it was said: ‘‘In too many
cases, the invitation will come accompanied with a suggestion, subtle or otherwise, that
failure to accept will hurt the student’s chances to play high school sports and diminish the
odds that she could continue on to college. . . . Such a potent entreaty, playing as it does on
youthful hopes and fears, could well exert the kind of undue pressure that ‘disserve[s] the
individual and societal interest’ . . . ‘in facilitating informed and reliable decision making.’’’
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beyond the scope of this article. The argument presented here is simply that
the mature minor test should not apply to decisions that result in the
(minor) consenter risking unnecessary harm.
For example, it was noted above that in the United Kingdom some
sexual offenses are designed to protect minors from being sexually exploited
by schoolteachers who occupy a position of trust. To the extent that it is an
offense for a schoolteacher to have sexual intercourse with her 17-year-old
pupil, it is hard to justify the limitation placed on the consenter’s right to
consent under the harm principle. It is hard to see how a person aged 17 is
harmed by having a sexual affair with a 22-year-old schoolteacher, if she is
not harmed by having a sexual affair with a 22-year-old who is not her
schoolteacher.
Limiting consent as a defense in such cases seems to be aimed at
preventing exploitation and at protecting children from having to choose
whether or not to accept the sexual advances of their teachers in the
context of attending school. However, in this context it is difﬁcult to see
why the mature minor could not give a valid consent. Arguably, the law
rests on a public interest justiﬁcation that this is not a decision that
a minor should have to make in the school context, because the minor
belongs to a vulnerable class of citizens. Similarly, there is a public interest
in having laws to prevent minors having to choose whether to have
unnecessary cosmetic surgery to comply with socially constructed beauty
norms, because that is a decision they should not have to make until they
reach adulthood.
Compare the above scenario with one where the 17-year-old consents to
having harmful cosmetic surgery that leaves her suffering permanent pain
and injury.128 There seems to be no reason not to let a mature minor have
128. In R. v. Cornwall [2013] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 159 at 164, a schoolteacher was given
a prison sentence of sixteen months for sending messages via the Internet to pupils sug-
gesting sexual activity, but no sexual activity took place. It was observed that had the teacher
sent messages, or even had sexual relations, with the 16-year-old and 17-year-old who he
tried to entice, it would have been lawful if not in the context of a relationship of trust, in
other words, if he had not been their teacher. In R. v. Wilson [2008] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 543 at
544, a trainee teacher had a consensual affair with a 17-year-old girl and was jailed. Lady
Justice Hallett said: ‘‘A very considerable penalty had been paid by Wilson for his behavior.
His career in teaching was over and he would remain on the sexual offenders register for
years to come and would never work with children again.’’ Cf. Belinda Carpenter et al.,
Harm, Responsibility, Age, and Consent, 17(1) NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (2014).
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a say in cases where the decision involves an activity that is aimed at harm
prevention rather than an activity that unnecessarily exposes her to a risk of
permanent injury. A mature minor might want to make a decision that will
prevent her from being harmed, such as choosing to purchase prophylactics
or contraceptives to prevent her from contracting a sexually transmitted
disease or from the social burden of having a child before she is sufﬁciently
mature to provide for it. Similarly, a decision to have necessary life-saving
medical treatment or medical treatment that is aimed at preventing some
greater harm by curing a genuine medical condition is a decision that
relates to harm prevention, not to risking harm for a nontherapeutic or
other social need. It is not objectionable to allow a mature minor to have
some input in harm prevention decisions. If a mature minor refuses life-
saving treatment, then we are back in the territory of the minor choosing
harm rather than harm prevention, but the courts are likely to hold that the
minor is not mature.
The minor’s ability to consent aside, the overriding factor is the harm
principle. Regardless of whether the minor consents or whether her parents
consent, what an adult person can consent to have done to her is limited by
the doctrine of limited consent laid down in R. v. Brown.129 As we have
seen, the doctrine of limited consent holds that consent is no defense in
cases where the defendant inﬂicts actual or serious bodily harm upon the
victim without lawful justiﬁcation. Children can consent on their own
behalf in certain limited circumstances, but neither an adult nor a child
can consent to being physically harmed unless the authorized harm comes
within one of the exceptions set out in R. v. Brown.
B. Law Reform: The Minimum Should be an Offense to Protect
Minors
In Queensland, Parliament amended the Public Health Act 2005 to crim-
inalize nontherapeutic surgery performed on minors. We need similar
legislation that aims to protect minors. In Queensland, § 213B of the Pubic
Health Act 2005 provides:
(1) A person must not perform, or offer to perform, a cosmetic procedure
on [a child under 18 years of age]. The maximum penalty is 2 years
imprisonment.
129. [1994] 1 A.C. 212.
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(2) A person does not commit an offense against subsection (1) if the
person believes, on grounds that are reasonable in the circumstances,
that performance of the procedure is in the best interests of the child.
(3) Proof that the person did not have sufﬁcient regard to any of the
following matters is sufﬁcient proof that the person did not have the
belief mentioned in subsection (2)—
(a) if the child is able to form and express views—the views of the
child, including the reasons why the child wants the procedure
to be performed, taking into account the child’s maturity and
understanding of the procedure, including the risks, limitations
and possible consequences of the procedure;
(b) to the extent it is practicable for the person to consult a parent of
the child—the views of the parent, including whether the par-
ent supports the procedure being performed on the child;
(c) the child’s physical health, including whether performance of
the procedure would correct a growth or congenital abnormality
or the physical effect of a medical condition, illness or trauma;
(d) the child’s psychological health, including whether the effect of
performing the procedure on the child is likely to be positive;
(e) the timing of the procedure, including whether waiting until the
child is an adult would be better than performing the procedure
now.
The main problem with the Queensland offense is the potential scope of its
‘‘best interests’’ defense. If the surgeon can establish that she had a reason-
able belief that it was in the minor’s best interests to have the surgery,
she will have a defense. It is not clear whether the legislation allows the
‘‘best interests’’ defense to apply only to genuine medical procedures that
are necessary to ‘‘correct a growth or congenital abnormality or the physical
effect of a medical condition, illness or trauma,’’ but also to unnecessary
harmful cosmetic surgery, which the surgeon reasonably believes is neces-
sary for ‘‘the child’s psychological health.’’ If all the subsections (i.e., §§
213B(3)(a)–(e)) have to be satisﬁed, then the defense is limited to cases
where the surgeon reasonably believes the surgery is necessary to correct
a growth or congenital abnormality or to treat some other genuine medical
condition.
If the defense also allows the surgeon to perform cosmetic surgery that is
unnecessary to correct a genuine physical deformity, merely because she
reasonably believes that the consenting child understood the risks involved,
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that the parents approved the surgery, and that the ‘‘the child’s psycholog-
ical health, including whether the effect of performing the procedure on the
child is likely to be positive,’’ made it in the child’s best interest to have the
surgery, the defense would be too wide.
Such a prong in an offense criminalizing surgery for minors has the
potential to make the offense self-defeating. For example, if a 14-year-
old requests breast implants or labiaplasty because she feels insecure
and it would make her feel better to have one of these procedures,
a surgeon relying on parental consent might use the ‘‘best interests’’
defense to try to medically defend unnecessary cosmetic surgery to treat
a problem that requires a psychological remedy and nothing more.130
It has been reported that 250 girls under 16 have been given breast
augmentations on the National Health Service in Britain, with the
youngest recipient being merely 10 years old.131 The justiﬁcation that
is invoked to disguise nontherapeutic cosmetic breast augmentations as
medically necessary is the claim that it meets the putative patient’s
psychological needs.
130. Kazuhiro Hayashi et al., Importance of a Psychiatric Approach in Cosmetic Surgery,
27(4) AESTHETIC SURGERY J. 396 (2007). See Schulman v. Group Health Inc. (2008) 11
Misc. 3d 90 at 95, where McCooe, J., said: ‘‘Embarrassment is insufﬁcient to establish
medical necessity. The complaint should be dismissed upon the ground that the plaintiff
failed to prove a psychological condition caused by his enlarged breasts which constituted
a medical necessity to justify the surgical procedure. It is undisputed that he never saw a
psychiatrist, psychologist or any medical professional including his pediatrician for a
psychological problem related to his enlarged breasts.’’ In Viveros v. State Dept. of Health
and Welfare (1995) 889 P.2d 1104 at 1107, McDevitt, C.J., said: ‘‘The Department excludes
from Medicaid coverage ‘[c]osmetic surgery which is not medically necessary.’ Neither the
federal nor Idaho’s statutes and regulations deﬁne the term ‘medical necessity,’ but the
Department has created a guideline to deﬁne the term as used in IDAPA. The Department
considers a surgery to be medically necessary, and not cosmetic, if there is a stabilization or
improvement in the functioning of a body part, or if the procedure relieves pain. Under this
standard, emotional, mental, or psychological factors are not recognized by the Department as
improvements in functioning that would be reimbursable under the Medicaid Program.
. . .The Department’s decision to deny Medicaid is supported by the record. Nothing in
the record indicates that the otoplasty surgery was medically necessary. Viveros’ mother
stated that the purpose of the otoplasty surgery was for psychological reasons, i.e., to
improve Viveros’ self-esteem and social skills.’’ (Emphasis added.) See also A.M.L. v. Depart-
ment of Health, Div. of Health Care Financing (1993) 863 P.2d 44.
131. Daniel Martin, 250 girls under 16 given bigger breasts on NHS at cost of £5,000 a time,
(THE LONDON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 15, 2012).
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Clearly, we need a law to protect minors both from parental consent and
from unscrupulous doctors who are motivated by money, not medicine.
The right of a parent to have his or her child have nontherapeutic harmful
cosmetic surgery, whether for religious reasons or aesthetic reasons, is out-
weighed by the rights of the child. The state has a duty to act in a child’s
best interests, and this often involves protecting the child from the bad
decisions of his or her parents.132
There may be cases where surgery is required as a matter of necessity,
because psychological and psychiatric treatment alone does not provide
a sufﬁcient remedy, but such cases are likely to be extremely rare. Such an
example is that of a limb being removed as a matter of necessity to
prevent a person suffering Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) from
risking graver harm by trying to amputate it herself by lying her hand or
arm on a railway line.133 Extreme cases of necessity should not be used
by surgeons to justify their performing cosmetic surgery (i.e., breast
implants, labiaplasty, etc.) on minors because psychiatric and psycho-
logical counseling provide an adequate remedy in the latter scenario.
Coupled with this, in the latter scenario, there is little risk in the standard
case of the minor who is denied cosmetic surgery engaging in self-harm.
CONCLUS ION
It has been argued that unnecessary cosmetic surgery that carries a high
risk of long-term harm should be criminalized because it involves wrong-
ful harm. It is harmful when there is a high probability of it resulting in
seriously harmful complications. In some cases the harm can occur for
years after the medical procedure is performed. It is wrongful because the
surgeon knows the medical science, knows the high rate of complications,
knows that it is unnecessary, knows that it carries a high risk of serious
harm, and knows that it is nontherapeutic, but willingly inﬂicts the harm
for the purpose of making money. The surgeon violates the dignity of
both adult and minor patients when she carries out risky nontherapeutic
132. Landgericht (Koln) (151 Ns 169/11) Unreported May 7, 2012 (Germany).
133. See the cases discussed in Sarah Ramsay, Controversy Over U.K. Surgeon Who
Amputated Healthy Limbs, 355(9202) THE LANCET 476 (2000).
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harmful cosmetic surgery merely because a vulnerable patient has re-
quested it.
Nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery can be harmful in a direct sense
because it causes physical harm, or in an indirect sense because it rein-
forces artiﬁcial celebrity or racist134 appearances as the preferred social
norm. In the case of children, it may be the parent pushing his or her
child to conform to these absurd beauty standards. It seems that harmful
cosmetic surgery has evaded criminalization because the medical profes-
sion has legitimatized it by tradition and convention. Police and prose-
cutors are trained to go after conduct that has traditionally been labeled
as criminal and often miss the criminality in conduct that exists under
a social disguise.135 The medical profession has hidden the criminal harm
in unnecessary cosmetic surgery by dressing it up as genuine medicine.
Science has a major role to play in criminalization decisions. In the case
at hand, scientiﬁc medical evidence is important for establishing that the
particular cosmetic procedure carries an unacceptable risk of seriously
harming the putative patient. A book-length evaluation of the relevant
science would be necessary to draw a ﬁrm conclusion about the physical
harmfulness of a given medical procedure because it is necessary to consider
not only the degree of harm involved but also the probability of the
resultant harm. A further example of the relevance of science relates to the
mature minor test where the science is still in dispute. Coupled with this,
psychological scientiﬁc evidence is also relevant because if it can be shown
that psychological counseling provides an adequate remedy, then this
would show that the proposed cosmetic surgery is not necessary to make
the putative patient feel psychologically content.
134.We saw above that some Asian parents have forced their children to have eye surgery
to look more Anglo. For generations, Jewish mothers have forced their daughters to have
cosmetic rhinoplasties to give them a more Anglo-type nose shape. See Rita Rubin, A Nose
Dive for Nose Jobs: As Standards of Beauty Shift, Rhinoplasty—Once a Rite of Passage for Jewish
Teens—Declines in Popularity, (TABLET, June 7, 2012), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-
life-and-religion/101732/a-nose-dive-for-nose-jobs. See also SANDER L. GILMAN, MAKING
THE BODY BEAUTIFUL: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AESTHETIC SURGERY (1999).
135. Dennis J. Baker & Lucy X. Zhao, The Criminality of Fines Imposed by Car Park
Companies, 176 CRIM. L. & JUST. WKLY. 297 (2012); JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET
RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (6th ed.
2000).
628 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 17 | NO . 4 | FALL 2014
Furthermore, strong evidence demonstrating the psychological beneﬁt
from cosmetic surgery would help to demonstrate that reasonably safe
forms of cosmetic surgery ought not be criminalized. The psychological
beneﬁt could be sufﬁcient to justify the patient taking a high risk of being
harmed in a trivial way by the cosmetic surgery. The science might also
demonstrate that the patient falls into the category of medical necessity
because without the surgery she or he will suffer serious psychological
harm, but such cases are likely to be extremely rare and the evidence would
have to be very convincing to stop psychological harm being used as
a ﬂoodgate for decriminalization of harmful cosmetic surgery.
A moral philosopher can make a moral argument for criminalization by
working from the presumption that minors have less capacity than adults,
but a lawmaker has to make sure that such a presumption is supported by
the relevant science. Again, a book-length evaluation of the relevant science
would be necessary to draw a ﬁrm conclusion about the degree of mental
capacity possessed by a mature minor, but the scientiﬁc evidence as reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court and by the numerous scholars cited
above seems sufﬁcient for tentatively arguing for a blanket ban against
harmful cosmetic surgery for minors. The evidence seems to show that the
majority of those under the age of 18 have less capacity than the majority of
those above that age. The law has to draw a line based on the percentage of
people within that population who lack full capacity.
Furthermore, psychological and scientiﬁc evidence might be used to
prove that mature minors, even if mentally mature, are more vulnerable
than adults.136 This would support the case for enacting a law similar to the
Queensland law, because it would support the argument that a minor is
particularly vulnerable and thus ought not be put in a position where she
can choose unnecessary plastic surgery to conform to the artiﬁcial beauty
norms that have been set by our celebrity-worshiping society. Even though
consent from an autonomous adult should provide a defense to unneces-
sary cosmetic surgery that does not carry a high risk of serious harm, it is
arguable that mature minors ought not be allowed to consent to unneces-
sary harmful or harmless cosmetic surgery because they belong to a vulner-
able class within our society. In a nutshell, adults ought to be able to
136. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2729 at 2760; J.D.B. v.
North Carolina (2011) 131 S.Ct. 2394 at 2397; In re Stanford (2002) 123 S.Ct. 472 at 474.
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consent to reasonably safe cosmetic surgery, but minors ought not be
allowed to consent to any cosmetic surgery.
More generally, it has been argued in this article that regardless of the
mature minor argument, the wrong and harm criteria support the case for
criminalizing certain cosmetic procedures. Consent from an adult, let alone
a minor, ought not provide a defense to surgeons who perform cosmetic
surgery where that surgery is proven to be medically unnecessary and is
scientiﬁcally proven to carry a high risk of resulting in unnecessary harm.
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